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Abstract 
This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the role of the state in 
influencing the formation of global cities in emerging economies, and highlights the 
complexity of this role due to challenging external environments, divergent interests 
of state actors, and socio-economic and institutional constraints that these actors are 
under. At an empirical level, it examines the progress of Shanghai in its state-led 
development as an emerging global city and the respective roles of the national and 
local governments in this process.  
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Introduction 
 
The  formation  of  the  global/world  cities  and  the  role  of  the  state  in  this  process  is 
seriously under-explored (Sassen 1991 & 2001; Friedmann 1995 & 2001; Olds & Yeung 
2004).  Despite this, however, urban planners and city authorities, especially those in 
emerging economies, have demonstrated remarkable interest in state-led global/world 
city formation (Olds and Yeung 2004). The contrast here raises two important research 
questions.    First,  what are  the  chances  for  leading  cities of emerging economies  to 
become  global/world  cities?  Second,  to  what  extent  can  the  state  in  emerging 
economies facilitate this formation?  This article explores such questions in the context 
of  Shanghai’s  emergence  as  a  global  city.  Emerging  economies  here  are  loosely 
defined as major developing countries that are characterised by fast economic growth 
and industrialisation, and increasing integration into the global trading system (OECD 
2008).  
 
Shanghai’s re-emergence as a leading world city had been anticipated. In fact, along 
with Hong Kong and Singapore, Shanghai was for the period of 1919-1939 the largest of 
the three ‘sub-regional’ financial centres in Asia (Jones 1992). But the city declined, first 
due to the Japanese occupation (1937-1945), and then, after the foundation of the PRC 
in 1949, a socialist system that practised ‘financial repression’ and an insular planned 
economy (Jao 2003). With the  rise of the  Chinese economy following its  reform and 
open-door policy from the late 1970s, however, it is widely expected (e.g. Friedmann 
1995;  Mainelli  &  Yeandle 2007)  that  Shanghai  will  once  again  become  a  significant 
player in international finance. On the other hand, turning Shanghai into a global/world 
city has been a much publicised Chinese ‘state project’ since at least the early 1990s, if  
 
not  earlier  (Zhang  2003;  Wu  2009).  However,  numerous  reviews  of  Shanghai’s 
prospects  (Shi  &  Hamnett  2002;  Jao  2003;  McCauley  &  Chan  2007,  Jarvis  2011; 
Subacchi et al 2012) either as an international financial centre or as a global city have 
consistently sounded a cautious note, especially in terms of its competition with Hong 
Kong. This is despite Shanghai’s improvement on several fronts since the early 2000s 
(see Part 2).  
 
So to what extent has Shanghai succeeded in becoming a global city? What role has the 
state  played  in  this  process?  Furthermore,  what  does  Shanghai’s experience  tell  us 
about the capacity and constraints of the state in emerging economies to facilitate global 
city formation? These are the important questions to be explored. 
 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Part One reviews the relevant literature. Part 
Two discusses the vision of this ‘state project’ and evaluates the evidence on Shanghai’s 
progress in global city formation. Part Three explores the underlying factors. Part Four 
concludes.  
 
I. Perspectives on Global/World City Formation and the Role of the State 
 
In order to develop an analytical framework for the empirical analysis, we first introduce 
the concept of the global/world city. We then discuss theoretically the scope for leading 
cities in emerging economies to become global/world cities. Finally, the potential role of 
the state in this formation is considered. 
 
1.1. Defining world/global cities  
  
 
Although Hall (1966) did much to popularise the idea of world cities, it was Friedman and 
Wolff  (1982)  who  undertook  the  conceptual  ground-breaking  work.  In  the  context  of 
economic restructuring in the world-economy starting from the 1970s and adopting a 
world-systems perspective, they conceptualised the world city as 
(i)  ‘an instrument for the control of production and market organization’ by 
transnational capital and  
(ii)  a junction between the national economy and the world economy.  
They  saw  these  cities  as  ‘major  sites  for  the  concentration  and  accumulation  of 
international capital’, tightly connected with each other and occurring ‘exclusively in core 
and  semi-core  regions’  (p.  59).  Friedmann’s  (1986)  subsequent  formulation  of  ‘The 
World City Hypothesis’ further linked  these cities to the ‘new international division of 
labour’, characterising them as the ‘basing points’ for global capital.  
 
In contrast, Sassen (1991) distinguishes ‘global cities’ from ‘world cities’ and insists that 
global  cities  are  a  new  type  of  economic  coordinating  units,  specific  to  the  era  of 
globalisation  since  the  1980s.    In  the  context  of  spatially  dispersed,  but  globally 
integrated  economic  activities,  global  cities  function  ‘as  command  points  in  the 
organization of the world economy, as sites for the production of innovations in finance 
and advanced service for firms, and as key marketplaces for capital.’ (Sassen 1991, p. 
338).  Sassen (1991) also recognises that these cities do not simply compete with each 
other, but function as one transterritorial marketplace.  
 
Sassen’s  (1991,  2001)  focus  on  the  provision  of  advanced  services  by  global  cities 
stresses that these cities function similarly as international financial centres, defined as 
localities  with  an  intensive  concentration  of  a  wide  variety  of  international  financial  
 
businesses  and  transactions  enjoying  both  agglomeration  and  scale  economies  in 
financial transactions (Kindleberger 2000; Z/Yen Ltd 2005). Sassen’s global cities also 
possess other industries supporting the capability of global corporate control and various 
amenities to maintain the life-style of the key professionals. 
 
Synthesising Sassen’s emphasis on the provision of advanced services by global cities, 
Castells' (1996) idea of a ‘global network’ of urban centres and Braudel’s (1984) insight 
into the inherent monopolistic tendency of capitalism led Taylor (2000) to conceptualise 
world/global cities as the highly concentrated loci of ‘unique knowledge complexes’ that 
exploit  their  monopoly  power  based  on  economic  reflexivity.  He    suggests  that 
contemporary globalisation has led to a ‘World City Network’, defined as an interlocking 
network where cities are connected through the activities of trans-nodal agents, most 
importantly  transnational  advanced  service  firms.    ‘World  city-ness’  can  then  be 
measured in terms of the level of provision for advanced producer services relative to 
the top scoring city, or its ‘interlock connectivity’ (Taylor 2000, 2004). A major advantage 
of Taylor’s approach is that a city’s ‘world city-ness’ can be objectively measured.  
 
1.2. The chances for latecomers 
 
The three perspectives referred to above have different implications for the prospects of 
new global cities in emerging economies. Although the World City Hypothesis itself has 
relatively little to say on this issue except that world cities only occur in core or semi-
periphery  regions  (Friedmann  1986),  the  world-systems  theoretical  framework  is 
nevertheless insightful. The framework conceptualises the contemporary world economy 
as a hierarchy, within which participating areas play differentiated roles either as core, 
semi-periphery,  or  periphery.  While  the  core  areas  have  more  core-like  (defined  as  
 
monopolistic and highly profitable) production processes (e.g. finance) and strong states, 
the periphery areas have more periphery-like (defined as competitive and less profitable) 
production processes and weaker states. In contrast, the semi-periphery is in transition 
towards the core, and is therefore the most dynamic type of area (Wallerstein 2004). 
Thus  the  chance  of  global  city  formation  in  an  emerging  economy  depends  on  the 
progress of its national economy, and, in turn this formation can  strengthen the home 
economy’s bid to raise its position. 
 
The  Global  City  Model  (Sassen  2001)  has  somewhat  different  implications.  Since  it 
regards global cities as the production sites of highly specialised corporate services and 
financial  innovations, and  as  marketplaces for  these  services  and  products,  there  is 
greater room for manoeuvre at the city level. In other words, the fortunes of emerging 
national  economies  and  their  nascent  global  cities  need  not  be  synchronised 
theoretically.    Much  would  depend  on  how  quickly  the  city  itself  can  develop  the 
capability of corporate control, acquire  the necessary  infrastructure and  lifestyle,  and 
attract other market players.  Studies of international financial centres suggest that, while 
the  more  established  centres  benefit  from  the  forces  of  centralisation  due  to  scale 
economies, agglomeration economies and their ‘endowed capacities’, newly emerging 
centres  can,  by  contrast,  benefit  from  the  forces  of  decentralisation  thanks  to 
outsourcing,  regionally  specialised  knowledge,  and  emerging  localised  demand 
associated with increasing inward foreign investment and fast economic growth. There is 
also  scope  for  latecomers  to  increase  their  chances  through  policy  initiatives  (Jarvis 
2011).  
 
Finally, while the World City Network school is light on theorisation, it has done much to 
deepen our understanding of city’ network connectivity and  power, defining the last as  
 
both  ‘to power over’ other cities and an ability to attract advanced service firms (Taylor 
2004).  In particular, a  Globalising  City  Index  has  been  formulated to  distinguish  two 
kinds of  driving  forces,  namely  ‘place power’  and  ‘network power’,  underpinning  two 
types of globalising cities. While the first type draws power from being the headquarters 
(therefore command centres) of top firms in the world, the second type draws power 
from high connectivity (Taylor et al 2011). This analysis implies that global city formation 
can benefit from either strengthening headquarter functions, or improving connectivity, or 
a combination of both.  
 
1.3. The role of the state in global city formation 
 
While the dominant World City Hypothesis and the Global City Model provide limited 
guidance on the role of the state in global city formation, insights can be drawn from 
elsewhere  in the literature. Taylor’s (2000)  analysis of the  distribution of world cities  
shows that while a combination of decentralisation and large national economies tend to 
be  associated  with  multiple  world  cities,  centralisation  and  medium-sized  economies 
tend to produce one dominant world city in each state.  
 
On the other hand, examining the experiences of New York, Tokyo and Seoul, Hill and 
Kim (2000) distinguish two types of global cities, namely a ‘market-centred, bourgeois 
type’ versus a ‘state-centred, political-bureaucratic type’. Their work usefully contrasts 
some of the characteristics of the two types and highlights a crucial link between the 
state-centred global city and the developmental state. They argue that Tokyo was not 
primarily a global basing-point for the operations of stateless transnational corporations 
(TNCs), but mainly a national basing-point for the global operations of Japanese TNCs. 
They further state that the global control apparatus represented by Tokyo resides in the  
 
financial and industrial policy networks under the guidance of government ministries, 
rather than networks of transnational service firms.  
 
Olds and Yeung (2004) propose a useful typology of three kinds of global cities: ‘hyper 
global cities’; ‘emerging global cities’; ‘global city-states’. Their discussion of what they 
see  as  the  relative  disadvantage  of  emerging  global  cities  is  particularly  relevant. 
Relative to ‘hyper global cities’ such as New York and London, emerging global cities 
are  regarded  to  be  less  integrated  into  the  global  economy,  functioning  mainly  as 
‘coordination/channelling centres responsible for receiving or channelling inward flows’ 
(p. 506). Relative to the ‘global city-states’  (e.g. Singapore and Hong Kong), emerging 
global cities are said to face more potential competition from other urban centres in their 
home country, and are ‘governed in a relatively more complex, less coherent, and less 
strategic fashion’ (p. 508). Furthermore, they are constrained by the tensions inherent in 
national-versus-urban politics. Finally, the lack of a colonial past generally makes the 
emerging global cities less open, cosmopolitan and attractive, compared to global city-
states. The critical condition for emerging global cities is ‘the sustainability of national 
efforts in developing particular cities to become global cities’ (p. 507).  
 
The experience of Tokyo (Hill and Kim 2000) and Singapore (Olds and Yeung 2004) 
help shed light on the prospects of Shanghai as a global city: they highlight the important 
role  of  a  developmental  state  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  disadvantage  of  being  an 
emerging global city on the other. The Chinese state is not a typical developmental state. 
In comparison with the paradigmatic Japanese developmental state, the Chinese state is 
characterised by ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ arising from  a tradition of administrative 
decentralisation, has weaker capacity, and is less inclined and able to work with the 
private sector because of its socialist ideology (Beeson 2009). Moreover and related to  
 
the ideological difference with the West, the Chinese state faces a much less permissive 
external environment compared to the Japanese state (ibid). This is further aggravated by 
the direct role of the state in emerging Chinese state-owned TNCs and sovereign funds 
(Wooldrige  2012).  The  implication  is  that  China’s  path towards  global  ascendance  is 
likely to be more contentious than Japan’s. So Shanghai’s will be similarly difficult in its 
pursuit of global city status relative to Tokyo’s. 
 
Weiss’  (1998)  emphasis  on  ‘managed  openness’  and  Chang  (2003)’s  institutionalist 
perspective on the role of the state in structural change are also relevant here. In the 
context of globalization and opening-up, ‘managed openness’ requires the state to adopt 
‘a  framework  of  analysis  and  policy  choice  that  is  both  “open”  to  the  benefits  of 
international economic flows and relationships, but “managed” in terms of their effects’ 
(Weiss 1998, p. 127). Following Michael Lind, Weiss (1997, p. 24) argues that efforts to 
maintain state power in the context of globalisation involve the ‘reconstitution of power 
around  the  consolidation  of  domestic  and  international  linkages’  by  building  power 
alliances.  The  traditional  ‘integral  state’  is  being  replaced by  a  ‘catalytic  state’.  Here 
states ‘achieve their goals less by relying on their own resources than by assuming a 
dominant  role  in  coalitions  of  states,  transnational  institutions,  and  private-sector 
groups.’ Weiss  suggests  that  the  strength of  a  ‘catalytic’  state  in external  inter-state 
coalition depends critically on the strength of the state-business alliance at home. Here 
the state’s capacity is strongly affected by its domestic public-private relationship. On the 
other hand, as an instance of effecting major structural change at the city level, state-led 
global city formation would oblige the state to show not only ‘entrepreneurship in the 
sense of providing the “vision” for the future and building new institutions’, but also to 
manage the conflicts which would inevitably arise during the process of any structural 
change (Chang 2003, p. 46).  
 
 
To sum up, state-led global city formation in an emerging economy could be considered 
part of the state’s strategy to lift its national economy from the periphery to the core, as 
well as developing a knowledge-based economy in the city. Challenging the established 
global  cities  is  necessarily  a  difficult  process.    The  state  not  only has  to  act as the 
planner, institution-builder and interest mediator, but also has to change itself and the 
ways it works. These represent major challenges for an emerging economy, and even 
more so for a transitional economy, defined as moving from a planned economy to a 
market economy and having weak market-supporting institutions (IMF 2000). In the case 
of  China,  while  the  party-state  insists  on  dominant  state  ownership,  which  both 
underpins its domestic power, and draws economic strength from it, this also serves to 
alienate established international market players. How and to what extent has the state 
risen to these challenges? We seek to answer this question below by first examining the 
planning vision for Shanghai and the evidence of its progress as an emerging global city.  
 
2. Shanghai as an Emerging Global City – State Strategies and Outcomes 
 
2.1. Strategic visioning and institutional building by the state 
 
Turning Shanghai into a global city has been characterised as a ‘strategy-based state 
project’ (Wu 2009). However, this strategy has been an evolving and intermittent  one, 
marked by changing visions and unstable relationships between the central and local 
authorities.    The  State  Council’s  (i.e.  the  central  government)  written  approval  of 
Shanghai’s Comprehensive Plan (BSUPPA 1986) states  
After several decades of hard work, Shanghai should be built into [a] socialist 
modern metropolis with prosperous economy, advanced science and technology,  
 
colourful culture, convenient transportation, sensitive information and handsome 
environment. It should also take the role of ‘the important base’ and ‘the pioneer’ 
in the construction of the modernization of our socialist country.  
 
Evidently  at  that  stage  neither  the  Municipality  nor  the  State  Council    had  a  global 
ambition for Shanghai.  
 
Following the establishment of the Pudong New Area and the opening of the Shanghai 
Stock  Exchange  in  1990,  however,  the  14
th  Chinese  Communist  Party  Central 
Committee  in 1992  called upon Shanghai to become the ‘dragon head’ of economic 
growth in the Yangtze River Delta and the whole Yangtze basin, and to turn itself into an 
international economic, financial and trade centre. This resulted from a major shift in the 
outlook of the Party following the intervention of the departing paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping.    The  Party  decided  then  to  adopt  a  ‘Socialist  Market  Economy’,  where 
significant public ownership of productive assets would co-exist with a dominant role of 
the  market  in  resource  allocation  (Zhang  2006).  This  created  an  impetus  for  the 
publication of an influential research report by the Municipality (Leading Group 1994)
1, 
Shanghai  Towards  the  21
st  Century,  in  which  an  ambitious  economic  and  social 
development strategy (1996-2010) was presented (see Table 1 for key planning targets). 
The report  proposes  to turn Shanghai into  ‘an international economic central  city’  by 
2010.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Editorial Committee included Shanghai’s mayor (as an honorary chairman) and a vice-
mayor as its chairman, as well as key staff from the Shanghai Municipality Development 
Research Centre.  
 
Table 1. Selected Strategic Targets and Actual Development, 1993-2010 
Indicators  Targets 
(2010) 
Actual (2010) 
No. of foreign financial institutions and agencies  >300  173 
No. of HQ, regional HQs and subsidiaries of TNCs  >500  305 
No. of  overseas  subsidiaries  owned by  Shanghai-
based companies 
>1000  179 
a 
Ratio of foreign trade to GDP  >50%  148.0%
b 
Share of volume of domestic securities transactions  80%  67.1% (2009)
c 
GDP (billion Yuan)  2000   1687 
Average annual growth rate of GDP (2001-2010)  9.8%  11.54% 
Proportion of the three industries in GDP  1%:39%:60%  0.7%:42.3%:57% 
Population size (million)  15.6  23
d  
Sources: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 2011; Leading Group of "Shanghai towards the 
21st Century" Research Project 1994;  2010 Statistical Communiqué on Economic and 
Social Development in Shanghai.  
Notes: a: refers to those newly established in 2010 only. b: the ratio peaked in 2007 at 
179.3%; c. includes transactions in shares and bonds. d: Including registered population 
and those migrant residents staying for 6 months or longer.  
 
Further momentum was created in 2001, when the State Council’s letter of approval for 
Shanghai’s  Master  Plan  indicated  that  Shanghai  should  become  an  international 
economic, financial, trade and shipping centre. Since then, the mission for Shanghai has 
been shorthanded as ‘A Dragon Head; Four Centres’. However, there followed almost a 
decade of relative policy silence from the national government. Two factors may explain  
 
this. First, the national politics turned against Shanghai from 2003 (see Part 3). Second, 
Shanghai was pre-occupied with the preparation and delivery of the World Expo, another 
‘state project’, held in 2010.  
 
It was not until April 2009 that policy momentum seems to have returned to Shanghai. 
With  the  world  economy  in  deep  recession  and  the  Chinese  economy  in  global 
ascendance, international expansion became high on the central government’s agenda. 
In  response  to  Shanghai’s  submission,  Accelerating  the  Development  of  Modern 
Services  and  Advanced  Manufacturing  in  Shanghai  and  Making  Shanghai  an 
International  Financial  Centre  and  International  Shipping  Centre,  the  State  Council 
reiterated that promoting the development of Shanghai as an international financial and 
shipping centre was ‘an important measure for our country’s modernisation and further 
reform and opening-up’ (SMG, 2011). It further stated ‘[B]y 2020, Shanghai should strive 
to basically have completed its construction as an international financial centre that is 
compatible  with  China’s  national  economic  power  and  the  international  status  of 
renminbi.’ This indicated that Shanghai’s project to become a global city has for the first 
time acquired unprecedented national significance.  
 
2.2.  Effects 
 
Three different kinds of evidence are used here to assess Shanghai’s progress in global 
city formation: 1) Shanghai’s changing ranking in the Global Financial Centre Index 
(GFCI) reports; 2) Its changing interlock connectivity measurements; 3) The outcomes of 
Shanghai’s strategic targets.  Compiled twice a year by the London-based Z/Yen Group 
since March 2007, the GFCI reports calculate ratings and rankings for several dozen 
cities by using a ‘factor assessment model’. This model combines two different types of  
 
input, i.e. instrumental factors (external indices) and assessment by professionals 
responding to on-line surveys (Mainelli and Yeandle 2007). Covering 77 financial centres, 
the most recent report (March 2012), at the time of writing, uses 80 external indices and 
responses from 1778 financial service professionals (Yeandle et al 2012). The 
theoretical maximum rating of GFCI is always 1,000. By contrast, a city’s interlock 
connectivity is calculated based on actual service values, which represent the 
importance of a city within a firm’s world-wide office network (see Taylor 2004, pp. 63-64, 
for methodology details).  
 
2.2.1. Becoming a global financial centre (GFC) 
 
Based on the available GFCI reports, Table 2 and Figure 1 illustrate several important 
features. First, all the four Chinese cities (Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen) 
and Tokyo experienced a significant rise in ratings between March and September 2009. 
The jump is especially big for Shanghai and Beijing, but also obvious for Hong Kong and 
Tokyo. This illustrates the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the relative rise of Asia-
Pacific  region,  rather  than  just  China.  Second,  related  to  the  first  point,  Shanghai’s 
ranking  in  the  GFCI  reports  saw  a  major  improvement  between  March  2009  and 
September 2011 (from 35
th to 5
th). Indeed, it came to tie with Tokyo (in 5
th place) in the 
9
th edition (March 2011) and overtook Tokyo in the 10
th edition (September 2011) (Table 
2). But it had fallen to the 8
th place in March-2012 edition. This has been attributed to 
concerns about the lack of ‘currency convertibility’ (Yeandle 2012).  
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. Changing ranking of selected GFCs 
Ranking 
(March. 
2012) 
City  Rating 
point (Mar. 
2012) 
Ranking 
(March 2007) 
Rating  point 
(March 2007) 
Change  in 
rating point 
(March  2007-
2012) 
1  London  781  =1  765  +16 
2  New York  772  =2  760  +12 
3  Hong Kong  754  =3  684  +70 
4  Singapore  729  =4  660  +69 
5  Tokyo  693  9  632  +61 
8  Shanghai  687  24  576  +111 
26  Beijing  644  36  513  +131 
32  Shenzhen  638  No ranking  No rating  na 
           
Source: www.zyen.com. Note: the March 2007 report and March 2012 report covered 
respectively 46 and 77 cities. 
 
 
Third,  Shanghai’s most important competitor, Hong Kong, has  done even better and 
maintained its lead over Shanghai since September 2009 (Figure 1). In fact, Hong Kong 
has  since  then  consistently  taken  the  3
rd  place  globally,  closing  the  distance  from 
London (in the top place) in the September 2011 report (although the gap widens again 
in the  March 2012 edition).  Fourth and finally, between March 2010 and September 
2011, Beijing joined the rank of the top 20 GFCs. Indeed, Beijing improved its rating 
more  than  Shanghai  during  2007-2012  (Table  2).  This  would  seem  to  suggest  that  
 
Shanghai’s post-2008 rise as a GFC is as much the effect of the ‘state project’ as the 
rise of the Chinese, or even regional, economy, since Beijing is not part of the ‘state 
project’, but a well-established gateway city to the Chinese market (Taylor et al 2011).  
 
Source:  The same as Table 2.  
 
 
While the GFCI reports put Shanghai significantly ahead of Beijing, studies of the ‘World 
City Network’  suggest otherwise.  Three kinds  of  measurement  have been taken: the 
command  and  control  function,  interlock  connectivity  and  Globalisation  Cities  Index. 
While the function is indicated by the headquarter location of top service firms, the Index 
comprises of City Place Power (CPP) (50%) and City Network Power (CNP) (50%). CPP 
is  overwhelmingly  determined  by  a  Business  Command  Index,  derived  directly  from 
headquarter functions of the Forbes 2000 top firms, whereas CNP is represented by the  
 
city’s network position in three sectors (business, financial and media services) in terms 
of connectivity. Based on 2008 data, Beijing is ranked the 9
th in CPP, compared with 
Hong Kong in the 22
nd place, and Shanghai in the 49
th place. However, Hong Kong, 
Shanghai and Beijing are respectively ranked as the 3
rd, 7th and 8
th city in terms of CNP. 
Indeed,  Shanghai  and  Beijing  are  the  two  cities  which  improved  most  in  global 
connectivity during 2000-2008. Finally, the overall Globalisation Cities Index, calculated 
as a percentage of New York’s (100) is 53.75 for Hong Kong, 48.87 for Beijing and 43.37 
for Shanghai (Taylor et al 2011). 
 
Thus the combination of the GFCI reports and the analysis of Taylor et al (2011) show 
the following. First, there has been significant global city formation in Shanghai, Beijing 
and  Hong  Kong  since  the  turn  of  the  century.  Second,  this  process  has  further 
accelerated  in  the  wake  of  the  2008  financial  crisis  as  a  result  of  the  relative 
strengthening  of  the  Chinese  and  Asia-Pacific economies.  Third, there  is  an  intense 
competition between these three cities. It is also clear that these cities have different 
sources of power: while Beijing enjoys significant Place Power and moderate level of 
Network Power, Hong Kong enjoys limited Place Power, but high level of Network Power. 
In comparison, Shanghai enjoys a moderate level of Network Power, but very limited 
Place Power. Therefore, although the CFCI reports, no doubt reflecting the views of the 
on-line contributors, seem to have written off the prospect of Beijing as a real competitor 
as GFC, the race may still be open. Indeed, if the experience of Tokyo (relative to Osaka) 
is any guide (Ryoichi 2011), then Beijing stands a good chance. 
 
Let us now turn to Shanghai’s outcome in realising its strategic targets. Table 1 shows 
that Shanghai’s performance has fallen short in several crucial areas. These include the 
number of foreign-funded financial institutions and transnational headquarters located in  
 
the  city,  the  city’s  share  in  the domestic  securities  market  and  change  in  economic 
structure.  However,  Shanghai  exceeded  its  planned  targets  in  aggregate  economic 
growth  and  economic  openness.  Socially,  its  population  target  was  exceeded  by  8 
million: Shanghai’s population has grown from 13m in 1993 to 23m by the end of 2010. 
The next section focuses on the change in economic structure, especially the growth of 
financial and business services. 
 
2.2.2 Structural change 
 
Changing statistical definition before and after 2003 makes it difficult to identify precise 
structural  changes  over  the  past  decade  except  at  a  broad  level.  However,  several 
important changes are discernible. First, there has been a significant de-industrialisation. 
The share of manufacturing in total employment fell by 8.2 percentage points over 2000-
2009. Nevertheless, the share of industry in GDP remains high at 42.3% as of 2010, 
compared to the 2010 target of 39% in the 1994 Strategy (Table 1). Shanghai has thus a 
long way to go to transform itself into a service-oriented or knowledge-based economy.   
 
Second, employment in high-value specialised financial and business services is low 
and its growth flat. As Table 3 shows, only 5 out of a total of 16 sectors have above-
average  labour  productivity.  In  descending  order,  these  are:  finance;  real  estate; 
information, computing and software; public administration and social organisations; and 
industry.  However,  the  share  of  employment  in  finance  and  real  estate  is  low, 
respectively 2.08% and 3.43% in 2009. Moreover, both shares fell during the period. The 
fastest employment growth took place (in descending order) in scientific research and 
technical services; information, computing and software; leasing and business services; 
accommodation  and  restaurants;  retail  and  wholesale  trade.    With  the  exception  of  
 
information, computing and software, however, these all have below-average levels of 
productivity (Table 3).  
  
 
Table 3. Employment and productivity changes in Shanghai, 2003-09 
Economic activities  Total employment 
(2003) 
Total  
employment 
(2009) 
Employment Change (2003-
09) 
GDP/jobs 
(10,000 
Yuan)  
(2009) 
Real 
productivit
y  
change(%) 
(2003-09) 
Number  Share 
(%) 
Number  Share 
(%) 
Number 
of jobs 
(10,000) 
Weight  
(%) 
Rate of 
change 
(%) 
   
All  813.05  100  1064.42  100  251.37  0.0  30.9  14.14  61.99 
Primary sector  73.72  9.07  48.53  4.56  -25.19  -4.51  -30.4  2.35  63.82 
Secondary sector  317.12  39.00  423.03  39.74  105.09  0.74  33.4  14.19  26.61 
      Industry  281.69  34.64  333.69  31.34  52.00  -3.3  18.5  16.21  40.36 
         Manufacturing  276.02  33.95  327.86  30.80  51.84  -3.15  18.8  n.a  n.a 
      Construction  35.43  4.36  89.34  8.39  53.91  4.04  152.2  6.64  -21.78 
Tertiary sector  422.21  51.93  592.86  55.70  170.65  3.77  10.4  15.07  85.12  
 
    Transportation, storage, post&telecom  45.90  5.65  54.28  5.10  8.38  -0.55  18.3  11.70  54.25 
     Information, computing and software  7.10  0.87  19.03  1.79  11.93  0.91  168.2  31.62  -13.47 
     Retails and wholesale  113.80  14.00  175.32  16.74  61.52  2.47  54.1  12.46  119.13 
    Accommodation and restaurants  23.51  2.89  42.79  4.02  19.28  1.13  82.0  5.57  -16.93 
    Finance  17.32  2.13  22.11  2.08  4.79  -0.05  27.6  81.60  99.35 
    Real estate  28.87  3.55  36.55  3.43  7.69  -0.12  26.6  33.86  85.61 
    Leasing and business services  21.60  2.66  55.46  5.21  33.86  2.55  156.8  11.58  166.29 
    Scientific research, technical service  
      and geological prospecting 
12.39  1.52  33.60  3.16  21.21  1.63  171.2  10.32  51.65 
water conservation, environmental  
and public facility management         
7.72  0.95  11.36  1.07  3.64  0.12  47.2  3.97  -46.73 
    Resident and other services  73.43  9.03  63.34  5.95  -10.09  -3.08  -13.7  2.48  158.85 
    Education  27.54  3.35  29.20  2.74  1.66  -0.64  6.0  12.95  94.90 
    Health, social security and welfare  16.33  2.01  19.58  1.84  3.25  -0.17  19.9  11.62  79.37 
    Culture, sports and entertainment  8.14  1.00  11.99  1.13  3.85  0.12  47.2  7.30  -27.78 
    Public administration and social  18.56  2.28  18.25  1.71  -0.31  -0.57  -1.7  17.98  199.96  
 
organisations 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 2006 and 2010. Own calculation.  
  
 
 
 
Third, judged by productivity and employment increases, only two sectors, i.e. retail and 
wholesale trade, and leasing and business services, stand out: over 2003-2009, their 
productivity rose by 119% and 166% respectively and their employment by 615,200 and 
338,600 respectively. However, both sectors’ productivities are below average, which 
indicates that they are unlikely to be serving high-end international customers. On the 
other hand, while the sector of information, computing and software registered the third 
highest productivity and added 119,000 jobs over 2003-2009, its productivity declined 
over this period. Moreover, its share in total employment is still very small (2% in 2009). 
Finally, the category of transport, storage and postal services and telecommunication, 
important to the ‘Four Centres’ function, lost employment weight and experienced below-
average productivity growth. In summary, it would seem that Shanghai has had rather 
limited success in developing specialised producer services.  
 
2.2.3. Economic Growth  
 
Shanghai’s smaller economic size relative to Hong Kong was once considered as an 
important  disadvantage  (Shi  &  Hamnett  2002).  However,  in  the  past  two  decades, 
Shanghai has made major strides in this respect. Starting with an economy only 21% of 
Hong Kong’s size in 1990, Shanghai’s GDP surpassed Hong Kong for the first time in 
2009 (Leung 2011). Not only was this 26 years earlier than expected byShi & Hamnett 
(2002),  it  was  apparently  9  years  earlier  than  expected  by  Hong  Kong  Trade 
Council(Leung  2011).  Rapid  population  growth  and  the  relative  appreciation  of  the 
renminbi helped.  
  
 
The  above  examination  shows  that, although Shanghai  has  made  some  progress  in 
global  city  formation  and  in  enlarging  its  economy,  it  is  still  limited  in  developing 
specialised financial and business services, not to mention global control capability. IAs 
an emerging global city, it is still overshadowed by Hong Kong, and is behind Beijing in 
important ways. Structurally, Shanghai’s transition from an industry-oriented economy to 
a service-oriented economy has only just begun. These are the consequences of the 
many constraints on the local and central state’s capacity to intervene.  
 
3. Constraints on the state 
 
3.1.Inflexibility in the orientation of the state-market relationship 
 
There are three particularly important issues here. First, the physical distance between 
Shanghai and the Chinese capital Beijing is a major disadvantage to Shanghai. As a 
socialist market economy, China’s current economic system is characterised by strong 
state ownership of important assets, especially in the financial and industrial sectors.  A 
majority of the Chinese financial institutions, including the four largest Chinese banks, 
and Chinese TNCs are owned by the central government and headquartered in Beijing. 
Indeed,  since  the  relocation  of  the  Bank  of  Telecommunications  from  Beijing  to 
Shanghai in 1990, no other major Chinese bank has followed suit. On the other hand,  of 
the 42 Chinese companies featured among the Fortune Global 500 companies in 2010, 
30 (71%) were headquartered in Beijing, three in Shanghai, two in Shenzhen, one in 
Hong Kong, with the rest (six) in five other cities inside China.
2   
 
                                                 
2 .www.researchbank.co.uk (accessed 28 June 2011).  
 
Second,  as  a  transitional  economy,  China  is  far  behind  Hong  Kong  in  economic 
openness and freedom, something much valued by international financial investors and 
institutions. According to the Fraser Institute, which compiles the Economic Freedom of 
the World report, Hong Kong has maintained its top spot as the world’s freest economy 
since the 1980s. Meanwhile, China occupies the 82nd place in the Economic Freedom 
Index in 2010.
3 Thus Shanghai continues to lag significantly behind Hong Kong in terms 
of market development (Subacci et al 2012).  
 
The third issue is the  continuing  non-convertibility  of  the  renminbi.  Here the central 
government is concerned about balancing the gradual relaxation of exchange  control, 
crucial to China’s financial internationalization as well as Shanghai’s global city status, 
and the minimisation of possible risks that this relaxation might bring the real economy, 
especially export-oriented manufacturing. China introduced current account convertibility 
in 1996, but retains capital account non-convertibility.  To minimise risk, the centre has 
apparently  decided  to  use  Hong  Kong  as  the  launch  pad  for  the  gradual 
internationalisation of the renminbi. It has actively supported the development of Hong 
Kong as its preferred offshore centre for  renminbi-denominated assets (Liu and Chiu 
2009). It would seem that, as a catalytic state, the central government is using Hong 
Kong, which officially retains a capitalist system until 2047, to manage China’s financial 
internationalisation. Thus Shanghai is unable to benefit from the historic opportunity of 
internationalising the renminbi, at least for the moment. 
 
3.2. Central-local politics   
                                                 
3 http://www.freetheworld.com/2010/reports/world/EFW2010-exec-sum.pdf. Accessed 28 
June 2011. The Index takes into account of: 1. Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, 
and Enterprises; 2 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights; 3 Access to Sound 
Money; 4 Freedom to Trade Internationally; 5 Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.   
 
 
Both  theory  (Jessop  1990;  Friedmann  1986;  Olds  and  Yeung  2004)  and  practice 
(e.g.Wang 2003) suggests that there are often divergent interests between the central 
and local governments in global city-making. Despite the unitary party-state, this is also 
the case in China (Beeson 2009). While the central government is primarily interested in 
strengthening its power both at home and abroad, local government is more concerned 
about  maintaining  strong  revenue  streams  and  promoting  local  economic  growth. 
However,  in  a  transitional economy  like  China’s,  policy concessions  from  the  centre 
bestow important economic advantages on those that are either liberalised or allowed to 
liberalise before others. Recent studies of the relationship between  network centrality 
and power in the World City Network literature shed useful light on this issue. Neal (2011) 
demonstrates that ‘a city’s powerfulness depends on the lack of centrality of the cities to 
which  it  is  connected.'  (p.  1).  Thus  a  city  like  Hong  Kong  that  has  the  central 
government’s blessing can go a long way in its global city formation, as such blessing 
effectively  enhances  Hong  Kong’s  power  by  maintaining  the  low  centrality  of  other 
Chinese cities.  
 
In its relationship with the centre, Shanghai has not fared very well in recent years. For 
instance, the share of the revenue that Shanghai can claim from stamp duty receipts has 
been gradually reduced from 50% to 20% (from 1997), then to 12% and eventually 3% 
(from  October  2000  onwards)  (Wang  2011,  p.  43).    While  it  initially  benefited  from 
substantive policy concessions from the central government through the establishment 
of the Pudong New Area in the early 1990s, its policy advantage has been weakened in 
recent years by the establishment of the Binhai New Area in Tianjin (in the north) in 2004 
and the designation of the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing (in the west) in 2010. A 
related fact is that, with the departure of Jiang Zemin (the former Chinese President and  
 
Shanghai ex-mayor) from Chinese politics in 2003, Shanghai has lost a strong supporter 
in the central government. On the other hand, Shanghai has shown weaknesses in its 
governance  and  its  relationship  with  the  wider  region.    Shanghai  Municipality’s 
reputation was tarnished by the discovery of misuse of its pension fund (for  property 
speculation) in 2006 and the consequent removal (in 2006) and eventual imprisonment 
of its former powerful boss (Party Secretary) Chen Liangyu in 2008 for 18 years. On the 
other hand, Shanghai’s performance as the ‘dragon head’ of the Yangtze River Delta 
and Yangtze Basin lacks the depth and breadth of the economic links between Hong 
Kong and its hinterland, the Pearl River Delta  (Sung 2011). The most recent central 
government pronouncement (2009) on Shanghai contains few real concessions, except 
for furthering Shanghai’s shipping centre function.   
 
3.3. Inter-city competition 
 
Given  administrative  decentralisation,  Chinese  cities  and  provinces  are  constantly  in 
competition  with  each  other  over  winning  policy  concessions  from  the  central 
government and winning businesses in various markets. The commodity ‘wars’ erupted 
in  the  1980s  have been  followed by furious  competition for  high-value financial  and 
business services. Shanghai is challenged not only by its traditional competitors such as 
Hong Kong,  Beijing and  Shenzhen, but  also  by  Tianjin  and  Chongqing. Perhaps as 
recognition of this situation, Shanghai’s 12
th Five-year Plan proposes that by 2015, the 
city’s share in the direct capital raised in the domestic capital market should reach 30% 
(up from 25% in 2010), much lower than one might expect.  
 
Competition with Hong Kong is surprisingly strong. This is partly due to the deft way in 
which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has handled its relationship with the  
 
central government in Beijing. Successive Governors and their administrations have 
tirelessly sought to gain policy concessions from Beijing and increass integration with the 
mainland in order to benefit from the latter’s prosperity. For instance, shortly after the 
completion of the 11
th national Five-year Plan, Hong Kong started to explore how ‘Hong 
Kong should be involved in the preparation of the 12
th five-year plan’ despite its 
autonomous status (Liu and Chiu 2009). This has paid off.  While the 12
th Plan contains 
only one mention of Shanghai’s function as ‘four centres’, it devotes almost a whole 
paragraph to Hong Kong and states 
 
To  continuously  support  Hong  Kong  to  develop  finance,  shipping,  logistics, 
tourism, professional services, IT and other high value-added services; support 
the development of Hong Kong as an offshore renminbi transaction centre and 
international wealth management centre; support Hong Kong’s development in 
high-value warehouse management and regional wholesale centre; consolidate 
and raise Hong Kong’s status as an international financial, trade and shipping 
centre; strengthen its global influence as a financial centre (NDRC 2011, p. 123, 
the author’s translation). 
 
Following this, the central government announced a set of 36 supportive measures for 
Hong Kong in August 2011 (Lianhe Zaobao, 18 August 2011).   
 
3.4. Other constraints 
 
Shanghai’s  attempt  to  develop  global  control  functions  has  so  far  suffered  from  a 
number of other constraints. For instance, like other Chinese coastal cities, Shanghai in 
the early 2000s aggressively engaged in place-making activities through large-scale real  
 
estate development (Wu 2009). However, concerned with spiralling real estate prices 
and the possible threat to social stability, from the mid-2000s the central government has  
introduced  a  series  of  increasingly  tough  policy  measures  to  dampen  this  sector’s 
expansion (Wang 2011). As a consequence, the real estate sector has stagnated in 
Shanghai in recent years (Table 3).  
 
On the other hand, as shown earlier, Shanghai has found it difficult to  reduce  more 
quickly its large manufacturing sector to  replace it with high-value service jobs. It has 
failed  to  add  jobs  where  labour  productivity  is  high  and  only  succeeded  where 
productivity is relatively low. It has also been weak in creating jobs in education, health, 
personal and  social services  (Table 3).  Thus Shanghai has been slow in developing 
‘knowledge complexes’. 
 
There is also strong evidence that policy actions by the Municipality have at times been 
constrained by changing national policy priorities. Analysis of the Municipality’s annual 
work plans since 2004 shows that the Municipality has grappled with  changing central 
priorities  echoing  the  centre’s:  kejiaoxingshi  (development  through  science  and 
education)  (2004-06);  development  of  resource-efficient  economy  and  eco-friendly 
society  (2006-08);  development  of  the  ‘Four  Centres’  and  industrial  upgrading 
(especially  towards  modern  services)  (2006-2010),  while  comprehensive  reform  in 
Pudong  and  the  preparation  and  delivery  of  the  World  Expo  were  on  the  agenda 
throughout.
4   
 
                                                 
4  Shanghai Municipality has published online its annual work program since 2004. 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node22396/index.html (accessed 
8 March 2011). Each annual programme covers 20 or so task areas.  
 
By contrast, Hong Kong has been largely left alone to focus on its strategy of becoming 
China’s premium service provider, as well as investment and tourist destination. On the 
other hand, by exploiting the opportunities created by mainland China’s recent economic 
expansion and through ever closer integration with the Pearl River Delta (and even the 
rest of China), and by  positioning itself within the national planning system, Hong Kong 
has been able to make itself more global as well as more Chinese. Liu and Chiu (2009) 
observe: “Instead being disembedded from the larger national and regional contexts, 
Hong Kong is becoming a Chinese global city.” (p. 115).  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Despite  persistent  efforts  by  the  local  authority  and  rising  national  economic  power, 
Shanghai’s  progress  in  global  city  formation  is  relatively  slow.  This  is  due  to  the 
numerous external and internal constraints that the city government is under, as well as 
underlying  economic  barriers.  While  some  of  the  constraints  (e.g.  dominant  state 
ownership; the West’s hostility) are specific to China, numerous others, including:  
(i)  the relatively under-developed condition of the market and institutions;  
(ii)  competition from other domestic cities;  
(iii)  national-local politics, as well as  
(iv)  the  inherent  difficulty  in  developing  knowledge  complexes  and  global 
corporate control capability in a transitional emerging economy context; 
may apply to other emerging global cities.  
 
Nevertheless, the rise of Hong Kong, Beijing and Shanghai shows that there is good 
prospect for emerging global cities. Moreover, the central state can play an important 
role by stimulating economic growth and implementing liberalisation. In particular, like  
 
Tokyo and Seoul, Beijing’s ascendance shows that fostering domestic TNCs is at least 
as important as attracting other TNCs.  
 
As for the global/world city scholarship, this study demonstrates that greater attention 
needs to be paid to studying the dynamics of how fast economic growth, domestic socio-
economic  characteristics,  activities  of  home-grown  TNCs  and  emerging  economies’ 
internationalisation strategies can significantly influence global city formation.  
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